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In the current debate over the future of the economic and 
monetary union (EMU) there is concern on how to cope 
with the existing instability of the system and the ensuing 
political tensions. However, the major issue to analyse is 
how and why the instability could arise. This route has 
been recently indicated in a part of the literature (Mody, 
2015, 2018; Stiglitz, 2017). This policy brief tries to go 
farther along this route and explain why the instability is 
strictly linked to structural features of the EMU.
The impossible trinity and the uncovered interest 
rate parity condition
The relation between interest rate and output in an open 
economy is strictly dependent on the exchange rate 
(Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963). If monetary cooperation 
evolves towards a system of fixed (or quasi-fixed) exchange 
rates, free mobility of capital implies that interest rates in 
different countries can no longer be independent. This is 
the foundation of the so-called “impossible trinity”, which 
means that the three objectives of fixed exchange rates, 
free capital flows, and independent monetary policy cannot 
be pursued simultaneously. This trilemma has explicitly 
determined the configuration of the international financial 
architecture in the post Bretton Woods era, and its validity 
has also been empirically confirmed (Aizenman et al, 2013).
The reasoning underlying the impossible trinity is based on 
the observation that, in the absence of a risk premium, the 
difference in interest rates between two countries is equal 
to the expected change in the exchange rate between the 
countries’ currencies: the nominal exchange rate appreciates 
if the domestic interest rate rises, or if the future expected 
exchange rate rises; it falls if the foreign interest rate rises. If 
this parity does not exist, there is an opportunity to make a 
profit through arbitrage, but free capital flows make sure the 
condition is respected almost instantaneously.
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This reasoning is of particular relevance for a durable 
(credible) system of fixed exchange rates. In such a system, 
the expected and the current exchange rate between two 
currencies must be the same, but this implies that also the 
domestic and the foreign interest rates must be equal.2 
In other words, if credible fixed exchange rates are to be 
maintained, nominal domestic interest rates – at least 
interbank rates – cannot differ from foreign ones as a 
result of independent monetary policies. If they differed 
while capital movements are free, there would be large 
capital movements towards (from) the countries with 
higher (lower) interest rates/rates of return. This necessarily 
causes the exchange rate to shift (up with an inflow, down 
with an outflow). 
The analysis of divergences and 
imbalances in the EMU suggests that failure 
to reduce inflation rate differentials in a 
monetary union may lead to increasing 
economic and political tensions and has 
indeed done so. However, it is also true 
that a top-down coordination of national 
policies for implementing structural policies 
in order to pursue that reduction would 
raise issues of democratic legitimacy. This 
epitomises the existential challenges that 
the EU faces nowadays.
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The combination of free capital movements and 
independent monetary policies is incompatible with a 
regime of fixed exchange rates – or with the prospect 
of exchange rates credibly remaining fixed. On the 
other hand, if fixed exchange rates and interest rate 
equalization (i.e., a single monetary policy between 
different countries) are guaranteed, either capital 
movements ought to be somewhat controlled or other 
policies should be implemented to get rid of inflation 
rate differentials, in order to maintain the (credibility of 
the) regime.   
The combination of free capital movements and 
independent monetary policies was particularly relevant 
in Europe during the years of the European Monetary 
System (EMS), and in particular at the time of the German 
reunification. The system of fixed exchange rates forced 
other countries to follow the German monetary policy 
managed by the Bundesbank3. 
On the basis of the experience of the EMS, the theory 
of the “impossible trinity” set the foundation for the 
EMU4. As the three objectives mentioned above cannot 
be pursued at the same time, the establishment of the 
EMU reflected the choice of one side of the trilemma: 
fixed exchange rates and free capital flows, with no 
independent monetary policy in the different countries.
The “uncovered inflation rate parity” condition
We argue that although monetary unification does 
indeed eliminate the tension between exchange rates 
and nominal interest rates, it does not solve the problem 
of the intrinsic instability of the system. By eliminating 
the intra-area exchange rates (with a single currency) 
and interest rate differentials (with a single common 
policy rate set by the common central bank), the 
problem of instability is simply transferred to inflation 
rate differentials, what we call the (impossibility of the) 
“uncovered inflation rate parity condition” in a monetary 
union (Acocella and Pasimeni, 2018)5. 
When the “uncovered inflation rate parity condition” is 
not satisfied, and the inflation rates of the participating 
countries diverge, with a single nominal policy rate set by 
the common central bank, there are two consequences. 
On the one side, divergences translate into a current 
account imbalance. On the other side, by implying higher 
real interest rates in lower inflation countries and lower 
real interest rates in higher inflation countries, they 
promote higher investment in the latter and a rise in credit 
demand and capital inflows from the former, fuelling 
imbalances in the capital account6. The more capital 
flows to the higher inflation countries, the more the 
inflationary pressure there rises. This leads to a vicious 
circle, which can further increase the divergences7. 
A single monetary policy for the whole area cannot 
be tailored to the diverging price dynamics of the 
participating countries, while real interest rates cannot 
move according to the requirements of different 
domestic conditions. Once countries with structurally 
different business cycles, diverging inflation rates and 
free capital movements agree on a single currency, there 
are no mechanisms that can ensure the equalisation of 
inflation rates in the short-medium run. Real interest rate 
differentials generate destabilising capital inflows and 
outflows, which, in turn, reinforce the incentives to cross-
border capital flows.
The recent history of the EMU has led some authors to 
argue that the lack of adequate supervision in deficit 
countries led to a misallocation of capital inflows, 
therefore fuelling excessive asset bubbles and creating 
inflationary pressure (García-Santana et al. 2016; 
Gamberoni et al, 2016). Others, instead, have seen in the 
deflationary policies conducted by surplus countries 
the main reason for the building up of the imbalances 
(Bofinger, 2015; Johnston and Regan, 2016). Both points 
of view suggest that a central European authority should 
be capable of imposing corrections, thereby challenging 
the policy preferences of member states. 
The seemingly only technical problem of inflation rate 
differentials leads, therefore, to political problems 
through economic imbalances and divergences. The 
reason is that a number of policies and institutions are 
different in various member countries, which leads to 
asymmetries. If the policies and institutions remain 
uncoordinated, they inevitably generate imbalances, 
which can become permanent and exacerbated. This is 
a key source of fragility of the system, as any financial 
stress can disrupt the precarious equilibrium, putting 
pressure on the relatively higher-inflation countries that 
must attract international capital flows to balance their 
trade deficits. The developments after the financial crisis 
have shown this plentifully.
Policy implications
The question then becomes how the difference in the 
inflation dynamics can be best kept in check and which 
institutional level is the appropriate one to address this 
challenge. The “uncovered inflation rate parity condition” 
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calls for a coordination of the national structural and fiscal 
policies, for the single monetary policy to work without it 
amplifying imbalances. In this perspective, in order to avoid 
disequilibria and the need for corrections, a central authority 
should be equipped for ensuring and enforcing a stronger 
coordination of national policies. This would challenge the 
policy preferences of national governments.
Respecting the parity condition implies keeping the price 
dynamics of every single participating country constantly 
under control and achieving a quasi-perfect coordination 
of national policies. This requires interventions on the 
evolution of the national economic structures and a stronger 
coordination of wage developments in each country as well 
as of labour and product market regulations. It also requires 
coordinating national fiscal policies, in a differentiated, but 
permanent, way8.
In other words, for the EMU to work effectively, a 
supranational authority would need to be extremely 
intrusive, taking decisions on matters which are at the core 
of the national political processes. This would inevitably 
erode and constrain the prerogatives at the national level, 
thus leading to issues with democracy. The process of top-
down economic policy coordination would inevitably touch 
upon the most politically salient areas of national policies 
(Leino and Saarenheimo, 2017). This poses an important 
problem of compatibility between the sustainability of 
the monetary union and the exercise of the democratic 
prerogatives at a national level. 
When strict coordination and the ensuring of democracy 
together with self-determination within the nation-state are 
desired, a trilemma arises. Self-determination in the nation 
states, democratic politics and full economic integration 
are mutually incompatible (Rodrik, 2007; 2011; 2017). The 
uncovered inflation rate parity condition, then, leads us to 
the application of Rodrik’s trilemma to the EMU: 
Figure 1: The political trilemma of the economic and 
monetary union
Source: adapted from Rodrik (2007).
If we deem democratic politics and full economic 
integration to stabilise the monetary union to be the 
higher-level objectives, nation-state sovereignty should 
be reduced: unified markets and even more a monetary 
union require supranational governance. A larger role 
for the self-determination of the nation state, instead, 
requires some limits either on the integration or on 
democratic choices. Full economic integration would 
require dropping either democratic choices within the 
nation states or self-determination of the participating 
countries; then political unification and governance 
should also be added. This includes EMU action for 
dealing with country inflation rates, e.g., through 
structural policies, and some kind of control of capital 
movements9. 
Conclusion
Building a stable and sustainable monetary union, 
legitimised by a democratic process of policy making, 
would require a move towards a European federation – 
something that is currently openly opposed and ruled out 
by many constituencies. The concern is that decisions 
on key value judgments can only be made legitimately 
within fairly homogeneous communities (Leino and 
Saarenheimo, 2017).
Preserving democratic choices and policy making at 
national level would make it impossible to reach the level 
of quasi-perfect coordination of key areas of economic 
policy making that the “uncovered inflation rate parity 
condition” would require to be satisfied, and therefore the 
monetary union to be stable and sustainable. A historical 
review of currency crises shows that persistent inflation 
differentials are consistently associated with a high 
likelihood of a currency union dissolution (Nitsch, 2005).
Pursuing a top-down coordination of national policies, 
in particular in all sensitive areas, and bypassing the 
electoral processes in order to fulfil the “uncovered 
inflation rate parity condition”, would exacerbate the lack 
of democratic legitimacy. The political trilemma of the 
economic and monetary union epitomises the existential 
problems the EU faces, and the “uncovered inflation rate 
parity condition” is at their core.
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Endnotes
1 Nicola Acocella is Emeritus Professor of Economic 
Policy at Sapienza University of Rome; Paolo Pasimeni is 
Senior Associate Researcher at the Institute for European 
Studies (IES) of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). The 
opinions expressed in this column are the authors’ alone 
and cannot be attributed to the institutions they belong 
to.
2 The two interest rates may only differ due to the 
presence of a “risk premium” due mainly to political risk, 
linked to specific characteristics of the two economies.
3 Eichengreen, Wyplosz (1993) model the attitude of 
Germany as a leader after re-unification and the effects 
of this on the crisis of the EMS of 1992-93.
4 The trilemma was applied to the EMS by Padoa-
Schioppa (1982), who spoke of an impossible quartet (the 
fourth element being free trade), and was popularized by 
Krugman (1987, 1999).
5 For a mathematical derivation of the condition see 
Acocella and Pasimeni (2018).
6 Lane, McQuade (2013) find a positive correlation 
between net capital inflows and domestic credit.
7 See Sinn (2010), Lane and McQuade (2013), Hale and 
Obstfeld (2014), Gabrisch and Staehr (2015), Storm and 
Naastepad (2016).
8 When financial cycles are not synchronised across 
countries, another layer of complexity is added, Obstfeld 
(2015) has even suggested the incompatibility of 
national responsibility for financial policy, international 
financial integration and financial stability, so that macro-
prudential policies become another important area 
requiring stronger coordination.
9 Freedom of capital movements is one of the founding 
tenets of EMU, but there are various tools that can at 
least diminish their reactivity, e.g. by establishing a 
common deposType equation here.it insurance.
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